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Munnichs, Rathenau Institute, and Anders 
Jacobi, Danish Board of Technology
European governments, as well as the Euro-
pean Union, aim at cost-efficient, convenient 
“electronic government”, designing new pro-
cesses, such as un-staffed border controls 
using electronic passports, public procure-
ment with digitally signed bids and contracts, 
or trans-border usability of medical reports 
and prescriptions. A project conducted on 
behalf of the European Parliament on the Se-
curity of eGovernment addressed whether 
such transactions, often done on the Internet, 
are secure and efficient enough. The project 
report showed (1) that there is no compre-
hensive strategy for securing eGovernment 
against advanced threats, (2) that citizens’ 
privacy could be better protected, and (3) 
that the possibilities of ICT are often overes-
timated by policy makers. The study was con-
ducted between 2011 and 2013 on behalf of 
the Science and Technology Options Assess-
ment Panel (STOA) by the Danish Board of 
Technology and its sister organisations, the 
Dutch Rathenau Institute and ITAS, members 
of the European Technology Assessment 
Group (ETAG). In this article, we introduce 
the approach used, highlight some findings 
from case studies, review some discussions 
from a workshop at the Parliament’s prem-
ises, draw conclusions, and finally present 
some of the policy options identified.
1 Introduction, Objectives, and Approach
Digitisation of administrations is supposed to 
save money and to lead to greater convenience 
for citizens and businesses. Doing processes elec-
tronically can save costs for labour or the han-
dling of paper documents. Moreover, citizens and 
business can use online services cheaply at any-
time from anywhere, and, in the case of electronic 
delivery, can obtain a service within seconds.
Objectives of the project were to identify 
the security and privacy issues that emerge from 
the implementation of eGovernment, to identify 
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whether the design of such electronic services 
is efficient, and to make policy makers aware of 
the problems and threats, in order to prepare for 
well-informed decisions on the future implemen-
tation of eGovernment in Europe. The project 
partners investigated three cases: electronic pub-
lic procurement, electronic patient records and 
the biometric passport.
2 Case Studies
Biometric passport: The technical implications 
of the EU-wide introduction of biometric pass-
ports were underestimated. The expectation that 
the ePassport would significantly simplify bor-
der control could not be realised. For example, 
there are no EU-wide standards for the quality 
of passport photos and fingerprints. All too fre-
quently EU member states opted for quick, user-
friendly procedures, at the cost of the quality of 
biometric data. This led to high error margins at 
border controls. In practice, the fingerprints used 
in the passports prove difficult to use because 
not all member states wish to exchange their se-
curity system keys. As a consequence, the cur-
rent system does not function well. In addition, a 
number of member states decided to use the data 
they collected also for investigations and fighting 
terrorism. The idea that this could all be done at 
once illustrates the lack of insight into the tech-
nological requirements. The present quality of 
the data collected for the biometric passport is 
too low for investigational purposes.
Electronic Procurement: Companies and 
public procurers must be able to be sure that op-
eration-sensitive information is not accessible to 
anyone. The European Commission wants to re-
quire all bids above certain thresholds to be sub-
mitted in digital form by 2016. This is one more 
example of high political ambitions. It appears to 
be asking too much: a mere five per cent of bids 
are already digital. It is unclear whether complete 
digitisation is sufficiently reliable, with attacks on 
networks and computers becoming ever more in-
genious. Various organizations, including NATO, 
have therefore decided to continue working with 
final contracts on paper. So one wonders whether 
full digitisation is always the best solution.
Electronic Health Data: The analysis of 
trans-border use of electronic health data re-
vealed problems with the identification of health 
professionals and with the proper translation of 
electronic patient records and prescriptions. An-
other challenge is that of using health data for 
research purposes, which should be anonymous, 
but too often allows re-identification of individu-
als. On a different level, it was recommended 
that national ID cards should be kept separate 
from health systems. A baseline security for pro-
tecting health systems should be agreed on and 
implemented in all member states.
Please see the Case Study Report (Jacobi et 
al. 2012) for details.
3 Workshop, Discussions, and Conclusions
In an expert workshop, a number of overarching 
issues were discussed.
Security: Recent attacks showed that attack-
ers can intrude even professionally managed sys-
tems, such as those of the security company RSA 
or those of the Coca-Cola Company. Therefore, 
systems must meet minimum security require-
ments, and system managers should follow ex-
tensive check-lists. As the above mentioned at-
tacks have shown, crafted attacks are very diffi-
cult to protect against. What would help would be 
to isolate sensitive, internal data from arbitrary, 
potentially malicious data which may arrive in 
infected e-mail attachments. Gernot Heiser pro-
duced a White Paper for the project workshop to 
indicate how such isolation could be built in a 
provably secure way (see Jacobi et al. 2013a). 
Provably secure systems, protecting against at-
tacks on confidentiality, availability or integrity 
of data, would even help against advanced at-
tacks, such as those made by large organisations 
or those made with insider knowledge.
The US armed forces already have such a 
system available. European governments could 
make the use of similar systems mandatory. The 
Snowden revelations show that a European, open 
approach to highly secure computers would be 
beneficial in order to have a European base of 
computers free of backdoors.
On a different level, government IT data 
bases may contain errors, therefore it was con-
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cluded that citizens need more legal means to 
correct such errors.
Privacy: Governments should apply “Privacy 
by Design� in its ICT systems as a standard proce-
dure. This might involve minimisation techniques 
(where only the data that is relevant for a specific 
goal is provided) or techniques that prevent data 
from anonymous files being traceable to individu-
als through “data mining�. One example is the use 
of “attribute based credentials� whereby only parts 
of the identity of a person are exchanged (such as 
“over 18� or “nationality Dutch�). At present, of-
ten complete identity data are requested. “Privacy 
by Design� could be strongly stimulated by the es-
tablishment of a knowledge base with examples of 
system architectures and programs, in a European 
context or otherwise.
Feasibility: Policy makers are often too am-
bitious when it comes to ICT projects. A feasi-
bility study in the draft phase of ICT projects is 
to show whether the various design requirements 
such as system security, user convenience, in-
teroperability and last but not least cost efficien-
cy are indeed compatible. Different system vari-
ants, with different interpretations of the design 
requirements involved, must be weighed against 
one another. This forces critical reflection on the 
actual goal that an ICT system is to serve and 
requires checks even after system roll-out.
Summarising, it can be said that the STOA 
study focused on the complex connection bet-
ween system design, policy goals, and user risks. 
The different requirements set for an ICT system 
can clash. This demands careful weighing of the 
goal that a system is to serve, the data required 
for this – which means, as well, which data are 
not required – and the proper degree of system 
security, privacy protection, user convenience, 
and interoperability. The study showed that such 
weighing is still being insufficiently done. Inde-
pendent experts and stakeholders should be in-
volved in this. Members of Parliament, be it on 
national or EU level, must obtain insight into the 
results and the necessary considerations. A list of 
more detailed options is available in the project’s 
report on policy options (Jacobi et al. 2013b).
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